The Credibility Verdict: When Governance Fails the Court
The Context
On 24 July 2026, 82 of the International Criminal Court’s 125 member states voted in a closed-door session at UN headquarters to dismiss chief prosecutor Karim Khan. This was the first removal of a sitting ICC prosecutor in history. The cause was not geopolitical intrigue—it was a finding of serious sexual misconduct with a junior staff member, coupled with an attempt to obstruct her complaint. The ICC’s executive bureau had already concluded in June 2026 that Khan had committed a “serious breach of duty” and “should be fired.” The vote was the culmination of an 18-month internal process: allegations surfaced in 2024, Khan stepped aside in May 2025, and a UN investigation followed. Yet, throughout this period, the institution’s governance bodies issued conflicting signals—one judges’ report cleared him, while the executive bureau pressed for dismissal. The result was a slow-motion crisis that has now permanently damaged the court’s moral authority.
The Risk
For directors, this is not a distant diplomatic incident. It is a textbook case of how a governance failure—over a single, foreseeable misconduct issue—can destroy an organisation’s legitimacy. The ICC’s board-equivalent, the Assembly of States Parties, had multiple opportunities to act decisively. Instead, it allowed parallel investigations, conflicting conclusions, and procedural delays. In a corporate context under New Zealand law, such conduct may indicate a breach of directors’ duties under the Companies Act 1993 (s.135 for reckless trading, s.137 for diligence) and the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (s.36 for officer liability). The fact that Khan attempted to prevent the complainant from filing a complaint is particularly dangerous: any director who tolerates or supports such obstruction could be personally exposed under whistleblower protection laws and anti-retaliation provisions. The protracted timeline—18 months from first allegations to dismissal—signals to regulators and the public that the board tolerated a toxic culture. In the Court of Public Opinion, delay equals complicity. The psychosocial damage to staff, the erosion of trust in leadership, and the brand collapse that follows are not abstract risks; they are the direct consequence of governance inaction.
The Control
The solution is not more policies. The ICC had rules against sexual misconduct. What it lacked was a governance system that could act swiftly, transparently, and without internal conflict. Directors must ensure that their organisation has a single, clear, and empowered body—not a committee of competing voices—that owns misconduct risk. This body must have the authority to suspend an executive immediately when credible allegations arise, and to commission an independent investigation without interference. It must also have the courage to act on findings, even when they implicate the most senior leader. The lesson from The Hague is stark: a board that waits for unanimity or consensus on misconduct will wait until the crisis is terminal.
The Challenge
These are the critical questions you should be raising at the board table:
| If a credible allegation of serious misconduct was made against our CEO today, how quickly—in days, not months—could our governance process suspend them and launch an independent investigation? | |
| Do we have a single, unambiguous governance body—not multiple committees with overlapping authority—that owns misconduct risk and can make binding decisions without internal conflict? | |
| What is the maximum time we would tolerate between a first internal complaint about a senior leader and a board-level decision to act, and what is our process for ensuring that timeline is enforced? |