The Foreseeable Strike: Director Liability at the Fifth Fleet
Governance
The Context
On 28 February 2026, Iranian missiles and Shahed-type drones struck Naval Support Activity Bahrain—the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Juffair. The attack caused “extensive damage” to critical infrastructure, forcing the evacuation of US citizens and dependents. This was not a surprise. In June 2025, the base was locked down after an aide to Iran’s supreme leader publicly urged strikes on the American fleet in Bahrain. In November 2025, NSA Bahrain completed a formal Risk and Threat Assessment Visit (RTAV), documenting security vulnerabilities. Eight months of explicit warnings. A known, articulated threat. And yet, the defences were not hardened. The dispersion plans were not implemented. The shelters were not built. The missiles hit.
The Risk
For any director of a UK-registered company with personnel at NSA Bahrain, this factual matrix is a legal indictment. Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 imposes a duty to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of employees. The 2025 lockdown and RTAV findings transformed a geopolitical risk into a “recognised hazard” under the Act. Section 37 makes individual directors and senior managers criminally liable where an offence is committed with their consent, connivance, or attributable neglect. If an employee was killed or injured in that strike, a director who saw the RTAV report and did not act faces potential imprisonment. The same logic applies under the US Occupational Safety and Health Act’s General Duty Clause, where “willful” violations carry penalties exceeding $100,000 per violation. The liability is personal. The clock started ticking in June 2025.
The Control
The strategic solution is not more assessments. It is action. Directors must demand a documented, time-bound remediation plan for every “recognised hazard” identified in threat assessments. This plan must include: hardened shelters, revised muster points, shelter-in-place drills, dispersion of critical functions, and a clear escalation protocol for when intelligence indicates an imminent strike. The board must receive quarterly updates on implementation, with a red-flag mechanism for any delay beyond the committed timeline. The cost of hardening is measurable. The cost of a successful prosecution is not.
The Challenge
These are the critical questions you should be raising at the board table:
| Where are our personnel currently deployed, and what is the most recent formal threat assessment for each location—not the summary, the full report? | |
| For each identified vulnerability, what is the specific, budgeted, and deadline-bound remediation plan—and who on the executive team is personally accountable for its delivery? | |
| If the intelligence community issues a warning tomorrow that mirrors the June 2025 lockdown, what is our documented, rehearsed evacuation and shelter protocol—and can we prove it works? |